Relying on the Supreme Court’s holding in Stolt-Nielsen, Second Circuit Determines that Class Arbitration Clause As Unconscionable

Fensterstock v. Education Finance Partners, et al.

(2nd Cir. (N.Y.) July 12, 2010)

 

Plaintiff commenced this action asserting state law claims on behalf of himself and others similarly situated, alleging that defendants engaged in fraudulent and deceptive practices in connection with the solicitation, consolidation, and servicing of student loans.  Plaintiff alleged that defendants intentionally failed to disclose to borrowers that unless their payments were received on the precise day of the month on which they were due, defendants would alter the Amortization Schedule’s prescribed apportionment of the payment between interest and principal, diverting the entire payment to themselves as interest and preventing borrowers from paying off the principal of their loans.

 

Defendants moved for an order staying the action and compelling plaintiff to submit his claims to arbitration, pursuant to an arbitration clause contained in his promissory note, and to pursue them on an individual, rather than a class, basis.  The United States District Court for the Southern District of New York denied the motion, ruling that under California law, the arbitration clause of the agreement is unconscionable and therefore unenforceable.

 

Defendants appealed, arguing that the arbitration clause is not unconscionable under California law, or that if it is, then California law is preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act.  The United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed.  The court rejected defendants’ contention that the Federal Arbitration Act preempts California principles as to the conscionability of class arbitration waivers since California law places arbitration agreements with class action waivers on the exact same footing as contracts that bar class action litigation outside the context of arbitration. 

 

Additionally, the court applied California’s three-part test to determine whether a class action waiver in a consumer contract is unconscionable: (1) whether the agreement is a consumer contract of adhesion drafted by a party that has superior bargaining power; (2) whether the agreement occurs in a setting in which disputes between the contracting parties predictably involve small amounts of damages; and (3) whether it is alleged that the party with the superior bargaining power has carried out a scheme to deliberately cheat large numbers of consumers out of individually small sums of money.  The court held that the record in this case satisfied this test and concluded that the promissory note’s class action and class arbitration waiver clause was unconscionable.

 

For a copy of the decision click here

 

Toni Frain and Dan Gerber

 

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Frain.html

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Gerber.html

Court Dismisses Insurer’s CERCLA’s Cost Recovery Subrogation Claims

Chubb Custom Ins. Co. v. Space Systems/Loral, Inc. et. al. (United States District Court, Northern District of California, July 13, 2010)

This CERCLA cost recovery action was initiated by the insurer seeking recovery of costs incurred on behalf of one of its insured. Chubb alleged that defendants were jointly and severally liable for clean-up costs incurred in response to releases of hazardous substances at location owned by Chubb’s insured. Specifically, the action involved five properties in Palo Alto, California. Chubb alleged that the site is part of a larger, forty-seven acre site that was owned and occupied by Ford Aerospace.

In August 2003, Chubb’s insured (Taube-Koret) was named as a discharger with respect to the site by the California Water Quality Control Board and was held strictly liable for complying with certain Cleanup Orders issued by the board. Taube-Koret made claims pursuant to an insurance policy issued by Chubb for response costs and attorney fees incurred in connection with the investigation and cleanup of Site. Pursuant to the terms of the insurance policy, Chubb paid $2,400,000 for its insured’s response costs. Thereafter, Chubb filed the instant action alleging defendants bear the responsibility for the cleanup and sought recovery of the cost on behalf of its insured. Defendant’s filed motions to dismiss the complaint on numerous procedural and substantive grounds, including challenges to Chubb’s subrogation claims under CERCLA §112(c).

Ford Motor first contended that Chubb lacked standing to bring a Section 112(c) claim because it did not allege that any payments Chubb made to its insured constitute "compensation pursuant to" CERCLA. It argued that an example of a party that would have standing is "an insurance company that settles and pays on behalf of a potentially responsible party ('PRP') with an insurance policy, claims made by the government in an action brought against the PRP under CERCLA Sections 106 or 107(a)." Moreover, Ford claimed that the complaint alleged only that Chubb made payments pursuant to an insurance policy and the policy obligated Chubb to pay money subject to terms that have nothing to do with CERCLA; noting the coverage provisions of the policy do not even mention CERCLA, much less restrict themselves to payments made "pursuant to the statute."

The court disagreed with Ford that that the plain language of the statute supports its interpretation. Rather, the court was persuaded by Chubb's argument that Section 113(f)(1) is evidence that Congress knew how to require a prior Section 106 or 107(a) claim with respect to contribution and could have done the same for Section 112(c) subrogation claims if it so intended. Notwithstanding this interpretation, the court found that Chubb failed to properly plead its standing. Specifically, the court noted that while a Section 112(c) plaintiff is not required to show that the compensation it paid relates to a CERCLA claim that already has been resolved through settlement or litigation, a plain reading of Section 112(a) requires plaintiffs to plead that the compensation was paid for damages or costs resulting from a CERCLA violation. The court further held that while the complaint comes close to doing so, "Chubb never explicitly sufficiently ‘connects the dots’ between its payments to its insured under the insurance policy, the costs its insured incurred, and the alleged CERCLA violations." As such, the court ruled that, Chubb had not pled standing to bring its CERCLA subrogation claim under Section 112(c).

The court further held that Chubb failed to meet the ripeness and statute of limitations requirements to support its CERCLA subrogation claims. Likewise, Chubb failed in asserting its Section 107(a) claims Ford and the remaining defendants. As such, the court granted defendants’ motions to dismiss with leave to amend the complaint within thirty days of the Order.

For a copy of the decision click here

Paul Steck and Tom Segalla

Case provided courtesy of Lexis

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Steck.html

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Segalla.html

Professional Liability Monthly – July Edition is Now Available

For a free copy of this month's edition of the Professional Liability Monthly, click here

To be added to our circulation list whereby you receive this publication for free each month via email, please contact Brian Biggie at bbiggie@goldbergsegalla.com

 

Cases for Professional Liability Monthly

Med Assur v Hellman

Siracusano v Matrixx Tech

 Medical Mut Ins v Am Cas

Cal. Dairies v. RSUI Indem

Great Am. Ins. v. Bally

Macey v Car Cas

Liberty Mutual Comp

Download Pruco Complaint

Munich Counterclaim

Two Insurers Refuse to Defend Chinese Drywall Claims

Granite State Ins. Co. v. American Bldg. Materials  Inc.

(M.D. Fla. July 13, 2010)

 

Two insurers have filed suit against their insured, American Building Materials Inc. (“ABM”), a drywall supplier, and KB Home Inc., alleging that their policies do not cover claims arising from defective drywall installed in homes constructed by KB Home.

 

In 2009, ABM reported 35 homeowner claims to the plaintiff insurers. The claims arose from the “unusual release of sulfide gases” from ABM-supplied drywall used in the construction of homes by KB Home. ABM sought defense and indemnity against the claims for itself and KB Home. The insurers denied coverage based on the policies’ pollution exclusions. According to the insurers, “the mere presence of defective drywall is not ‘property damage’ and there is no coverage under the policies for any costs arising out of the process of repairing or replacing the drywall.” The insurers also denied coverage based on lack of an “occurrence,” damage outside the policy periods, and because no lawsuit had been filed seeking damages under the policies.

 

The U.S. Consumer Product Safety Commission reports that it has received thousands of complaints from residents who believe their health symptoms or the corrosion of certain metal components in their homes are related to drywall imported from China. Litigation involving insurance coverage for Chinese drywall claims is still in its infancy, however. Recently, a Louisiana judge held that a policy’s pollution exclusion did not bar coverage for Chinese drywall claims, while a federal court in Virginia decided in June that a policy’s pollution exclusion precluded coverage for the same type of claims.

 

For a copy of the complaint, click here

 

Carrie Appler and Dan Gerber

 

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Appler.html

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Gerber.html

Fourth Circuit Determines That Legally Objectionable Behavior By Counsel Is Not Enough To Overturn Arbitration Award

MCI Constructors v. City of Greensboro

4th Cir. (N.C.), July 1, 2010

 

This appeal arises from a contract dispute concerning the construction of a wastewater treatment plant.  All concerned parties agreed to submit to an arbitration which yielded an award to defendant.  The district court then granted the defendant’s motion to confirm this award and this appeal followed.  Plaintiffs claims, among other things, that the district court should have vacated the awards because the liability award was obtained through undue means. 

 

In order for a court to vacate an arbitration award, the moving party must sustain the heavy burden of showing one of the grounds specified in the Federal Arbitration Act.  Plaintiffs’ difficulty is that no court has ever suggested that the term undue means should be interpreted to apply to actions of counsel that are merely legally objectionable.  While there is some evidence in the record to support plaintiffs’ assertions that the defendant presented its main arguments on rebuttal and at least on one occasion referred to evidence outside the record, plaintiffs failed to establish that these actions led to the procurement of the award.  The FAA does not provide for vacatur in the event of any fraudulent conduct, but only where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue means.  Since plaintiffs failed to proffer any evidence that the undue means in dispute actually factored into the arbitration panel’s liability determinations, plaintiffs’ motion to remand is denied and the district court’s decision is affirmed.

 

For a copy of the decision click here

 

Sarah Fang and Jeffrey Kingsley

 

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Fang.html

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Kingsley.html

 

case provided courtesy of Lexis

Inside FAC: New York Roundtable 2010

Attached please find the transcript from the Inside Fac Roundtable which was conducted in New York recently.  The roundtable participants included:  Bill Jackson, Senior Vice President at Brit Insurance; Daniel Gerber, Partner at Goldberg Segalla; Elliot Richardson, CEO of Aon Benfield Fac; Frank Costa, President of Berkley Offshore; Jeffrey Kingsley, Partner at Goldberg Segalla; John Trace, Head of US Facultative GCFac; Martha Flanagan, Senior Vice President Facultative Gen Re; and Matthew Keeping, CEO of Willis Facultative.

There were several interesting topics that were discussed including the future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), the future of offshore Gulf of Mexico (re)insurance market in light of Deepwater Horizon,  and the issues involved with business interruption cover together with other topics. 

For a complete copy of the transcript click here

Inside FAC: New York Rountable 2010

Attached please find the transcript from the Inside Fac Roundtable which was conducted in New York recently.  The roundtable participants included:  Bill Jackson, Senior Vice President at Brit Insurance; Daniel Gerber, Partner at Goldberg Segalla; Elliot Richardson, CEO of Aon Benfield Fac; Frank Costa, President of Berkley Offshore; Jeffrey Kingsley, Partner at Goldberg Segalla; John Trace, Head of US Facultative GCFac; Martha Flanagan, Senior Vice President Facultative Gen Re; and Matthew Keeping, CEO of Willis Facultative.

There were several interesting topics that were discussed including the future of the Terrorism Risk Insurance Act (TRIA), the future of offshore Gulf of Mexico (re)insurance market in light of Deepwater Horizon,  and the issues involved with business interruption cover together with other topics. 

For a complete copy of the transcript click here

DISTRICT COURT DENIES APPLICATION TO CERTIFY “FOLLOW THE SETTLEMENTS” ISSUE

Employers Reinsurance Corporation v. Massachusetts Mutual Life

(W.D.MO, June 16, 2010)

 

In a dispute of reinsurance coverage, a reinsurer filed a breach of contract action against its reinsured for allegedly mishandling a large number of claims covered under their agreement.  Specifically, the reinsurer sought a declaration that it had no obligation to follow the reinsured’s settlement actions.  After the court granted judgment in favor of the reinsured on this issue and an issue regarding the applicable statute of limitations, the reinsurer filed an application to certify the “follow the settlements” and statute of limitations issues for an immediate interlocutory appeal.  Finding that certification of the follow the settlements issue had previously been requested and denied, the court once again denied the application on that issue.  The court further denied certification of the statute of limitations issue, holding that it is not a purely abstract legal question as required for an interlocutory certification.

 

For a copy of the decision click here

 

Bryan Richmond and Michael Glascott

 

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/Richmond.html

http://www.goldbergsegalla.com/attorneys/MGlascott.html

 

 

Environmental Coverage Quarterly July 2010 Edition is Now Available

Goldberg Segalla’s Environmental Coverage Quarterly provides timely summaries of and access to the latest environmental coverage developments nationwide, and is published quarterly. Cases are organized by court and date. In addition, we provide the latest information regarding news in the environmental coverage industries. For a free copy, please click here.

 

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